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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
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RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RUESDT/DTRA-OSSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3241  
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2251  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7458

S E C R E T GENEVA 001225

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA  
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24  
CIA FOR WINPAC  
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA  
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP  
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP  
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP  
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR  
NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019  
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)  
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA  
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) COUNTING RULES SUBGROUP MEETING,  
DECEMBER 13, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1198 (SFO-GVA-VII-103)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-134.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: December 13, 2009  
Time: 10:00 P.M. - 11:30 P.M.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)3. (S) The Subgroup on Counting Rules met on December 13 and made significant progress toward completing Articles III and IV. A productive exchange resulted in resolving issues related to "space launch facilities," the list of existing types, and the U.S. position on strategic offensive arms (SOA) that are subject to the Start Follow-on (SFO) treaty.

[1](#)4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: On the Fast Train; Space Launch Facilities and Article III; Existing Types; What are SOA?; and Reviewing Article IV.

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ON THE FAST TRAIN  
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[1](#)5. (S) Mr. Taylor stated the U.S. willingness to be flexible now that both sides were on the fast train following the

telephone call between the two Presidents the previous night and hoped that the Russian side would show flexibility as well. ADM Kuznetsov indicated that he had not yet received the official result of the telephone call and would be grateful for any information the United States could share. Kuznetsov quickly agreed to drop the Russian paragraph 11 in Article IV. (Begin comment: Deleted language was, "Nuclear armaments shall not be stored at air bases for heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments. End comment.) In addition, Kuznetsov agreed to the U.S.-proposed language taken from the eighth START Agreed Statement on limitations of basing and locations of heavy bombers and submarines outside national territories.

¶6. (S) Taylor agreed to drop the text in sub-paragraph 3(b) that limited the number of non-deployed ICBMs at each ICBM base to no more than five. However, the U.S. side stressed that the substance of paragraph 3(a) would not be dropped. Kuznetsov added that Russian experts had assessed that the number of non-deployed ICBMs could be greater than five at an ICBM base, depending on different conditions.

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SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES AND ARTICLE III  
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¶7. (S) Following a HOD discussion regarding the U.S. position of not combining space launch facilities with test ranges Taylor requested flexibility in permitting separate declarations for each, with the understanding that the United States would only declare such facilities if they contained

existing types of launchers. The Russian side agreed after the two sides agreed to the list of existing types in Article III.

¶8. (S) Kuznetsov believed that the United States should declare Trident I, MX, Minuteman II, and Minuteman III as existing types of ICBMs. Even if launchers do not exist the missiles could be used to "launch items into space," he said.

Mr. Taylor stated that the United States was prepared to accept Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper as existing types. Taylor stated that the U.S. side preferred to use the term Peacekeeper rather than MX for the designation. A proposed agreed statement would designate that when launchers of these existing types were eliminated or converted in accordance with the treaty, such ICBMs or SLBMs would no longer be subject to the treaty. The U.S. side confirmed that the agreed statement would include the last launcher of a type. The U.S. side undertook to provide text on the proposal. (Begin comment: The language on when a type ICBM and SLBM ceases to be subject to the treaty was subsequently inserted into the treaty in lieu of an agreed statement. End comment.)

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EXISTING TYPES  
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¶9. (S) In Article III paragraph 7(d)(ii), Russia proposed to designate the RS-12M and RS-12M2 as two existing types. When pressed further, the Russian side explained that this was consistent with the Russian-proposed definition of "new type" where a difference of five percent length of either the assembled missile without front section or length of first stage and/or a change in diameter of the first stage of three percent. (Begin comment: This definition is not yet agreed. End comment.) The U.S. side accepted this pending the final definition of "new type."

¶10. (S) Taylor noted that the Russian side had added the RS-24 as an existing type yet the United States had never seen the missile, nor had there been any exhibition during START. Kuznetsov acknowledged that there would be an exhibition and data exchanges with respect to this ICBM under the terms of the treaty once it entered into force.

¶11. (S) The sides turned to the differences in position on the Trident I being designated as an existing launcher of SLBMs. Taylor held that the United States would retain the brackets. Kuznetsov explained that the Russian Duma needed to understand that these systems were being addressed if they were not included in the treaty text. To address Russian concerns an agreed statement had been proposed as a solution to what Kuznetsov previously referred to as the "golden middle" (Reftel). Mr. Warner and Col Ilin would be discussing a mechanism that would permit the Russian side to confirm the conversion of the SSBNs to SSGNs. The United States would provide notification on ballistic missile launchers under the 1988 Agreement.

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WHAT ARE SOA?  
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¶12. (S) Following discussions during a previous Counting Rules Subgroup meeting (Reftel), the U.S. side presented an analogy, using agricultural products, vodka, and fertilizer to help explain the U.S. view that certain SOA would be captured by the treaty while others were not, and that some items other than SOA could also be limited. The key point was that the treaty would not define SOA overall but only define which SOA would be limited by the treaty. SFO is about deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers equipped with nuclear armaments and not about new conventional heavy bombers. Kuznetsov acknowledged the rationale and agreed that it would be useful to convey these ideas to the Russian delegation.

¶13. (S) With this understanding, Taylor agreed to drop brackets so that the United States would declare Minuteman II and the Peacekeeper as existing types of ICBMs and the B-52G as an existing type of heavy bomber. The United States would not/not drop the brackets for Trident I as an existing type of SLBM and SLBM launcher.

¶14. (S) The United States was not willing to drop the brackets in 4(f) insisting that "heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments" was an important distinction and should be maintained in the text that described when SOA are "born." Taylor stated that this issue could be resolved when the heavy bomber counting rules were resolved.

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REVIEWING ARTICLE IV  
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¶15. (S) The U.S. side agreed to drop paragraph 6 limiting the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges to no more than 15. Paragraphs 7 and 8 on test and training launchers were accepted by both sides. The U.S.-proposed that the number and locational limits for test heavy bombers in paragraphs 9 and 10 remain in brackets. Russia's paragraph 7 on basing restrictions for non-deployed heavy bombers, and paragraph 8 on joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments with heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments remained in brackets until the overall issue involving heavy bombers had been resolved. The sides agreed to drop Russian paragraph 11 to restrict storage of nuclear armaments at airbases for heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments.

¶16. (U) Documents provided: None.

¶17. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Taylor  
Lt Col Comeau  
Mr. Connell  
Dr. Dreicer  
Mr. Highsmith

Mrs. Zdravekey  
Mr. French (Int)

RUSSIA

ADM Kuznetsov  
Ms. Fuzhenkova  
Ms. Melikbekian  
Mr. Trifonov  
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

[1](#)18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
GRIFFITHS